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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900552-CA

ANA LILIA GONZALEZ,

Priority No. 2
De fendant/Appe11ant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. § 76-2-202
Code Ann. § 76-6-408
Code Ann. § 76-6-501
Code A m . § 76-6-502
R. Evid. 402
R. Evid. 403
R. Evid. 801(c)
R. Evid. 803(3)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the evidence establish that the defendant acted with

a purpose to defraud when she completed the writing of another?
(i.e. did the defendant rely, in good faith, on the perceived
authority?)

This Court reviews the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, and reverses a conviction where "the
evidence and its inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.,n

State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 (Utah App„

1989) (citation omitted).
2.

Did the trial court err when it prohibited a witness

from testifying about a matter critical to, and corroborative of, the
defendant's defense?

,f

[T]rial court rulings on the admissibility of

evidence are not to be overturned in the abscmce of a clear abuse of
discretion."

State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988).

"To

constitute an abuse of discretion, the error must have been
harmful."

State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989) (citations

omitted); cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (error must
be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
3.

Did the trial court err when it admitted an exhibit

irrelevant to, and unconnected with, proof of the crime charged?

The

abuse of discretion standard cited above applies here as well.
4.

Did the trial court err when it refused the defendant's

jury instruction on reasonable doubt?

This issue involves a question

of law, with appellate courts granting "no particular deference to

- 2
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the trial court's ruling."

State v. Pedersen. 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,

12 (Utah App. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-501 (1978 & Supp. 1989), in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge, presiding.

The Court sentenced

Defendant/Appellant Ana Gonzalez to an indeterminate prison term of
one to five years and ordered her to pay various court ordered
amounts.

(R 79-80).

The Court then stayed the prison sentence,

imposing instead an 18 month period of probation.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 20, 1990, following a day at work, a co-worker
of Ana Gonzalez invited her to a party in the Capitol Hill area.
(T 107, 124). Ms. Gonzalez accepted, arriving at the party around
8:00 or 9:00 p.m.

(T 107).

While she was there, Ms. Gonzalez met a woman named Shannon
O'Neill1 who boasted openly about how she had used her sister's
checking account to buy some clothing.

(T 108, 122). According to

Ms. O'Neill, her sister permitted Shannon to use the checkbook on a

1

During the trial, the parties referred to Ms. O'Neill
as "Sherry" O'Neill and "Shannon" O'Neill. (T 108, 125-26, 152).
- 3
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loan-type basis.

(T 108). Many individuals situated nearby,

including Ana Gonzalez and Jeff Phillips, overheard Ms. O'Neill's
loud and boastful remarks.

(T 108, 137).

Ana Gonzalez remained at the party for only a short period
of time.

(T 109). Before she departed, Ms. O'Neill asked Ana for

some money to buy beverages and snacks.

(T 109). Since Ana had

already decided to leave, she agreed only to loan Ms. O'Neill "a
couple [of] bucks.11

(T 109). Ana then left, deciding to return the

next morning for her money.

(T 110). After visiting a friend, Ana

returned to her sister's house for the evening.

(T 124).

At approximately 8:00 a.m. the next day, Ana drove back to
see Shannon O'Neill.

Although Ms. O'Neill did not have the money,

she offered to pay Ana with the proceeds of a check.

(T 111-12).

Shannon asked Ana to buy some groceries with the check, complete it
for an amount exceeding the bill, and then pay herself back with
part of the change returned.

(T 112). Ana agreed, recognizing that

her mother had allowed her to perform similar tasks in the past.
(T 106-07, 134).
Approximately one and a half years ago, when Ana was 16
years old and without her own checking account2, h€>r mother loaned
Ana a checkbook and check guarantee card for occasional purchases.
(T 133-34).

Pursuant to her mother's authority, Ana would select

2

Ana Gonzalez did not, at any time thereafter, open her
own checking account. (T 105).
- 4
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an item, produce the check guarantee card, and then complete the
check.

(T 106, 134). No problems ever arose.

(T 106).

Consequently, when Ana went to the supermarket ("Smith's"),
she had no reason to believe that Ms. O'Neill's requests were
improper.

(T 112). Accompanying Ana were four individuals:

"Eric"; "Brenda"; Brenda's child; and an unnamed male.

(T 112).

Upon their arrival at Smith's, Brenda pulled out a shopping
cart and strolled down the aisles.

(T 113). While the two men

placed groceries and various body building items in the cart, Brenda
would stop for make-up and cosmetics.

(T 113). Ana asked them if

their selections were too expensive.

In response, they assured Ana

they would pay back Ms. O'Neill.

(T 115). Ana did not take

anything for herself.
The items amounted to $262.28.

(T 48).

The unidentified

man told Ana that $300 would be an appropriate amount for the
check.

(T 59).

While Ana proceeded to pay the amount, the man and

Brenda (and the baby) left the store with the groceries.
(T 50-51).

After completing3 the check, Ana gave the cashier the

check, a Smith's card, and a check guarantee card.

(T 47-48).

Although the cashier noticed nothing "unusual about Ms. Gonzalez's
behavior," the quantity and quality of goods caught the cashier's
attention.

(T 56-57) . The cashier wrote the necessary information

3

At trial, the parties disputed whether Ms. Gonzalez did
in fact sign the involved check. For purposes of this appeal,
Ms. Gonzalez concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support
her signing of the check. (T 62, 145).
- 5
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on the back of the check and then gave it to the assistant manager
(Richard Anderson) for verification.

(T 50).

Mr. Anderson called the number on the check, watching Ana
Gonzalez and Eric through out the duration of the phone call.
(T 62, 70). Anderson conceded, however, that Ana "just stood there
at the checkstand[.]"

(T 70-71).

In fact, even when Anderson

"hollered" at his assistant to grab the groceries until he could
determine if the check would clear, Ana simply waited by the
checkstand.

(T 71, 73).

By comparison, Eric "started to run off" though he was
quickly detained by store personnel.

(T 119). The other two

individuals (and the baby) "jumped in the car and left [without the
groceries]."

(T 68). Ana did not at any time attempt to "escape."

(T 73).
Having completed his phone call, Richard Anderson
discovered that the check was stolen.

(T 63-64).

He confronted

Ana, asking her if she was Christy [Cotner], the owner of the
check.

Ana answered honestly, telling him "no."

(T 118, 120).

Richard Anderson indicated that there was a problem with the check.
(T 120). Wondering what was wrong, Ana hoped Eric would assist
her.

Eric offered no explanation.

(T 121).

When police officer Jason Snow arrived, he questioned Ana
about her actions.

Ana told the officer about how Ms. O'Neill had

bragged about her accessibility to the checks.

(T 122). Ana also

indicated that Ms. O'Neill loaned her the checkbook.

- 6
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(T 96).

Ana

tried to explain the entire chain of events but felt that Snow had
already prejudged the incident.

(T 121-22, 129).

According to officer Snow, Ana said that O'Neill had
"passed" the checks and invited Ana to try it.

(T 97).

Ana did

not, however, use the word "fraudulent" during their discussion, nor
did she indicate that she knew something was wrong with the checks.
(T 98).

Nevertheless, Snow admitted that he imputed such a meaning

into Ana's statements.

(T 97).

The owner of the checkbook, Christy Cotner, testified that
she lost it "[i]n Graphic Expressions at the West Valley Mall."
(T 76).

She suspected a dark haired man of the theft.

(T 87-88) .

When Ms. Cotner arrived at Smith's, she identified Eric as the same
dark haired man suspected of the theft.

(T 79, 88). Ms. Cotner

made clear, however, that she had never met Ana Gonzalez before.
(T 79).
At trial, Ms. Gonzalez objected to the court's decision to
exclude Jeff Phillips' testimony.

(T 137, 162). Mr. Phillips would

have testified about the bragging by Shannon O'Neill, statements
bearing a direct relationship on Ms. Gonzalez's state of mind.

Ana

Gonzalez also objected to the admission of Exhibit 4, Christy
Cotner's checkbook.

(T 82).

She further moved to dismiss the case

for lack of sufficient evidence, particularly in regards to the
element of intent.

(T 131). Ms. Gonzalez's other objection

addressed the inadequacy of the reasonable doubt instruction.
(T 164). The trial court denied all the objections.

- 7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State did not prove that Ana Gonzalez acted with a
purpose to defraud.

While Ms. Gonzalez may have completed the check

of another, she acted only in good faith and pursuant to perceived
authority.

Ms. Gonzalez's actions, though admittedly foolish, did

not amount to criminal conduct.

Moreover, the State failed to

disprove the existence of the said authority.
The trial court's exclusion of Jeff Phillips' testimony
constituted prejudicial error.

Since his statements would have

corroborated the defendant's "good faith reliance" defense, they
were relevant evidence which the jury should have considered.
Mr. Phillips' testimony was offered to show its affect on the
listener (the defendant) and was critical to proving the lack of
criminal intent.
The trial court's inclusion of the checkbook was similarly
prejudicial because of its potential to confuse or mislead the jury
on issues not relevant to proof of the crime charged.
only charged Ms. Gonzalez with forging one check.

The State

Because no other

charges were filed and absent proof linking the defendant with the
other writings in the checkbook, the checkbook as a whole (as
opposed to the involved check) was irrelevant to proof of the
de fendant's intent.
The reasonable doubt instruction, though upheld in State v.
Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah App. 1990), should be
reconsidered in light of Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 339, 111 S.Ct.

(1990) (per curiam).

- 8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT ACTED WITH
THE PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD
"Ordinarily in proving the crime of forgery the state must
show that the defendant not only used the name of another, but must
also show that he did so without any authority so to do."

State v.

Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (1979); see also State v. Jones. 81 Utah 503,
20 P.2d 614 (1933) ("To establish falsity it must be made to appear
not only that the person whose name is signed to the instrument did
not sign it but also that his name was signed without authority").
In its attempt to prove this lack of authority, the State in the
case at bar showed only that the check holder, Christy Cotner, did
not allow Ms, Gonzalez to use her checking account.

(T 78-79).

In

short, the State alleged, Ms. Gonzalez misrepresented herself and
committed "forgery" when she signed Ms. Cotner#s name.

(T 38).

For purposes of this appeal,4 Ana Gonzalez concedes that on
January 21, 1990, she intentionally completed a writing (the $300
check) which purported to be the act of another.

Cf. (T 48, 62).

Nevertheless, one element not proven by the State was the "purpose
to defraud."

See (R 52, 60, 63). As discussed below, intentionally

completing the check of another is not the same as acting with the
intent to defraud:
To prove that an accused person signed the name of
another to an instrument, and that he passed such
instrument as genuine, does not prove the commission

See supra note 3.
- 9

of a crime. It must be shown that it was a false
instrument, and this is not proven until it is shown
that the person who signed another's name did so
without authority. Until the proof is made, it is not
shown to be a false instrument, and the defendant is
not put to his proof at all.
Collins, 597 P.2d at 1319 (Maughan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
In the present case, Ana Gonzalez used the check only after
obtaining seemingly valid authority from Shannon O'Neill.

(T 112).

Since Shannon had reportedly used her sister's checking account on a
loan type basis, Ana believed that any amount recedved from the
check would be returned eventually to Christy by Shannon.

Moreover,

Ana's own past dealings with her mother contributed greatly to a
belief that such transactions were not unlawful.

(T 105-06,

133-34).
If criminal culpability did exist, it should have been
shouldered only by Shannon O'Neill.

Christy Cotner did not

authorize Shannon to use the checkbook, a fact undisputed and
stressed repeatedly by the State.

(T 79).

The lack of Christy's

authority, however, did not negate the perceived existence of
Shannon's authority.

Since forgery requires the specific intent to

defraud, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501, Ana's belief in Shannon's claims
made her actions foolish—but not criminal.

Even if Shannon did not

in fact possess the requisite authority, the State still failed to
disprove Ana's reliance on Shannon's claims.

See State v. Wood, 648

P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah 1981) ("Unlike some other jurisdictions, Utah
imposes on the prosecution the burden to disprove the existence of

- 10 -

affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant
has produced some evidence of the defense").
All the State proved was that Ana completed the writing of
another.

If she had intended to defraud the grocery store, she

would not have waited patiently by the checkstand while everyone
else around her sought to leave.

(T 68, 71, 73, 119). At the very

least, she would have selected an item for herself.

Instead, Ana

cooperated readily with the management, complying with all of their
requests.

(T 73).

Perhaps in a civil context, Ana's naivete" would have made
her personally liable for the amount written on the check.

In a

criminal proceeding, however, the State must do more than show
foolishness.

Cf. State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah App. 1990)

(noting "the Legislature's disinclination to criminalize merely
negligent misrepresentations or omissions"); see also (R 61).
prosecution must prove the "intent to defraud."
63).

The

See (R 52, 60,

Having failed to do so, the State fell short of its burden.

Cf. State v. Gorham. 87 Utah 86, 48 P.2d 447 (1935) ("To establish
[forgery], it must be made td appear that the instrument so uttered
and passed by the defendant was false and forged, and, further, that
the defendant knew of its falsity when he uttered it"); State v.
Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).

- 11 -

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE NONHEARSAY
TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE WITNESS
"'Hearsay7 is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Evid. 801(c).

Utah R.

If, however, a statement reflects an individual's

"state of mind" or is indicative of the affect it had on the
listener, the otherwise inadmissible statement may still be
admitted.

Id. (these type of statements would not be offered "to

prove the truth of the matter asserted"); State v. Sorensen, 617
P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980) ("When an out-of-court statement is
offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether
it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule");
cf. State v. DiBello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Utah 1989) ("Hearsay
evidence that shows a defendant's mental state prior to the
commission of a crime is admissible under evidence rule 803(3)
if . . . it is relevant to prove or explain acts or conduct of the
defendant").
In the present case, the trial court erred when it refused
to admit the testimony of Jeff Phillips.

(T 162). In response to

the hearsay objection by the State, Ms. Gonzalez emphasized that
Mr. Phillips7 testimony bore directly upon her state of mind.
(T 162-63).

Hence, it was not offered to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.

Indeed, Mr. Phillips testimony would have

supported the finding that Ana acted only in good faith and in

- 12 -

accordance with perceived (versus actual) authority.

Cf. State v.

Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted) ("It is not
forgery for one to write another's name with authority"); State v.
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980) ("Evidence of a statement by
a third person is therefore admissible, . . . if it is offered to
support a defense of good faith").
United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.
1984), illustrates how important such "hearsay" statements are to an
individual's defense.

In Eisenstein, "a jury convicted appellants

of conspiracy to defraud the United States . . . and felonious
failure to file [income] reports with the [I.R.S.]."

Id. at 1542.

"The jury, however, was deprived of evidence that was relevant,
indeed crucial, to its determination of whether [appellants acted in
good faith]."

Id. at 1544.

"A defendant charged with violating the

reporting statute can attempt to negate proof of specific intent by
establishing the defense of good faith reliance on advice of
counsel."

Id. at 1543.

Consequently, when the trial court excluded

"hearsay" testimony supportive of appellants7 good faith intentions,
it committed reversible error.

Eisenstein, 731 F.2d at 1546.

Moreover, the appellate court held, the excluded testimony
could not be considered "cumulative of evidence already before the
jury."

Id. at 1546.

Despite the fact that the appellant "testified

as to the substance of his conversations with the lawyer and, in any
case, because the attorneys for both sides [made related arguments
to] the jury . . . ," id., the Eisenstein Court could not deem the
error harmless:
- 13 -

even though it might be true that appellants would
have been convicted for the lack of credibility of
their only defense, the harm in having been denied
such a defense is highlighted by the fact that, weak
as it might have been, reliance on advice of counsel
was appellants' only defense. The evidence of full
disclosure, consisting entirely of [appellant's]
unsupported testimony, could have been corroborated by
his lawyer. The trial judge's failure to permit this
highly relevant testimony cannot be dismissed as
harmless error.
731 F.2d at 1546.

Not overlooked by this holding was the Court's

recognition that "Ample evidence supported the convictions."
1542.

Id. at

Yet, because the excluded testimony focused on the critical

element of intent, the Eisenstein Court reversed the conviction.
Error also existed in the case at bar.

The State and

Ms. Gonzalez both recognized that Ana's defense focused on her
intent.

(Cf. 147) (wherein during closing argument the State

admits, "It appears that there's only one element in dispute and
that is the mental intent of the Defendant").

By excluding Jeff

Phillips testimony, the trial court eliminated relevant and
corroborating evidence on the most disputed fact of the trial.

The

jury should have been able to» consider the testimony supportive of
Ms. Gonzalez's "good faith reliance" defense.

Cf. United States v.

Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) (even though the
excluded "testimony might not have been credible . . . the issue was
one for the jury to decide . . . .")

- 14 -

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED THE STOLEN
CHECKBOOK INTO EVIDENCE
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.11

Utah

R. Evid. 402. At trial, Ms. Gonzalez argued that the checkbook
(Exhibit 4) was irrelevant to the proceedings because no connection
had been made between her actions and the checkbook as a whole (as
opposed to the single check [Exhibit 1]).

(T 82).

The trial court

rejected Ms. Gonzalez's argument, finding that since she was in
possession of the checkbook, the checkbook related to her state of
mind.

(T 85).
If the State had charged Ana with a crime relating to

possession or with some type of accomplice liability, the trial
court's ruling may have had merit.

However, since the State charged

Ms. Gonzalez with only one count of forgery, (R 52), and failed to
prove or even allege criminal involvement by Ana in the theft of
Ms. Cotner's checkbook, no relevant nexus existed.

Cf. (T 159)

(wherein the State admitted that "She's [Ms. Gonzalez] not charged
with theft of this checkbook.

She's not charged with anything other

than passing this check [#1923]").5

Absent a more appropriate

foundation, nothing other than check #1923 (Exhibit 1) should have
been admitted.

5

The State presented no handwriting expert, nor did it
lay a foundation connecting Ms. Gonzalez to the other checks.
Indeed, no witness for the State, including Ms. Cotner, knew who had
forged the other checks.

- 15 -

The trial court's error was especially prejudicial because,
as Ms. Cotner's testimony revealed, somebody had clearly practiced
forging her signature.

(T 78).

Ana Gonzalez was not that

"somebody," though, a fact evidenced by the State's unwillingness to
charge Ana with any other crime.

See (T 159). If the State had

suspected Ms. Gonzalez of involvement extending beyond her actions
at Smith's, they would have charged her under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-202 (accomplice liability), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (theft
by receiving stolen property), and/or Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502
(possession of forged writing).
Based on a lack of evidence, however, or the belief that
she was not actually responsible for writing on the other checks,
the State apparently viewed Ana's conduct in isolation and as
falling outside the scope of such potentially applicable crimes.
See (T 159). Consequently, the jury should not have considered what
the State failed to allege.
Merely possessing the checkbook, without more, was a fact
inconsequential to proof of the crime charged.

Admitting the

checkbook may have misled or confused the jury into considering
facts of crimes not at issue or alleged by the State.

"'[W]here

evidence [is] shown to have supported only conjectural inferences
which had little probative value, or where no evidence was adduced
that showed that a fact had any causal connection with the [crime
charged],' reversal may be appropriate on 'grounds that the
improperly admitted evidence could only have served to confuse and
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mislead the jury or to prejudice the outcome of the case.7"

State

v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted).
Alternatively, assuming, arguendof that the checkbook was
somehow relevant, its probative value was nonetheless "substantially
outweighed [for reasons similar to those stated above] by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury . . . "

Utah R. Evid. 403.

The trial court erred in admitting

the checkbook.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE DEFENDANTS
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
In State v. Pedersen. 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah App.
1990), this Court upheld a reasonable doubt instruction identical to
the one questioned in the case at bar.

Absent from the Pedersen

analysis, however, were two important considerations.

First,

everything reasoned by the Pedersen Court could have also applied to
a civil (clear and convincing) standard.
Louisiana, 498 U.S.

Secondly, Cage v.

, 112 L.Ed.2d 339, 111 S.Ct.

(1990) (per

curiam), a recent decision not considered by the Pedersen Court,
struck down a reasonable doubt instruction substantially similar to
the one questioned in the case at bar.
Because of the similarities6 between the Cage instruction
and the Pedersen instruction, the Pedersen instruction should also
be rejected.

Just as the Cage decision could not allow a

6

Both instructions have a presumption of innocence
clause; both instructions mandate acquittal if the State fails to
meet its burden of proof;
-[footnote cont'd on next page]- 17 -

"reasonable doubt" to be self-defining,7 it is not enough for the
Pedersen instruction to state "that the State's proof must obviate
all reasonable doubt."

Moreover, while equating a reasonable doubt

to the more weighty affairs of life may be improper, the language
approved in Pedersen, "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it . . ." appears no better.

The language could also apply to the*

"clear and convincing" civil standard and is just as deficient as
the "more weighty affairs of life" language.

Finally, both Cage and

Pedersen did not require proof to an absolute certainty, nor did
either preclude the use of the "mere possibility" language.
Perhaps, most importantly, the Cage opinion did not perform
a "harmless error" analysis.

Unwilling to place itself in the role

of factfinder for each and every criminal appeal, the Cage opinion
noted that the reasonable doubt instruction "is a prime instrument
for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error[,]"
and apparently left that task to the jury.

6 -[cont'd]both instructions do not require proof to an
absolute certainty; both instructions require the doubt to be
reasonable, or based on reason; Cage condemns doubts based on "mere
caprice and conjecture"; Pedersen disallows doubts which are "merely
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility";
and both instructions state that the doubt must be a doubt that a
reasonable person could entertain. Compare Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 12 with State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La. 1989).
7

Cage implicitly rejected the argument that the term,
"reasonable doubt," is self-defining. Despite the repeated
references to a "reasonable doubt," the Court struck down the
instruction.
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In sum, reversible error occurred when the trial court
rejected Ms. Gonzalez's proposed instruction in favor of a
constitutionally defective instruction.

The need for a properly

worded reasonable doubt instruction was critical for the jury in the
present case because the State's "proof" of criminal intent was
questionable at best.

Pedersen should be reexamined in light of the

recent United States Supreme Court decision.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction for lack of sufficient evidence or, in the alternative,
reverse and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

S

day of February, 1991.

LISA J. RE^AL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
itw

£

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
coStitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling or
f o l d i n g any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act'of another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to
be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.

76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device for writing.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly possesses any writing
that is a forgery as defined in Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud
knowingly possesses any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a
felony of the third degree, except where the altering, making, completion,
execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such writing would
constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which event the possession of the writing
or device for making such a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

HEARSAY.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.

